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Abstract: This paper attempts to use microsimulation methods to compare returns to education in
four European countries, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom. This paper broadens
the type of measure used to measure the return to education to include interactions with public tax-
transfer systems and to consider the effect of differential employment rates on education. Mincer
style wage equations are estimated for each country in order to model the return to education of
gross earnings. These estimates are then incorporated into a microsimulation model to estimate
social, private and fiscal returns to education in the countries. Both point estimates and a distribution
of the rates of return are described.
I  INTRODUCTION
E
ducation is an important investment tool, which can improve worker
productivity and influence economic growth. As an important determinant
of labour productivity, it also therefore has an important influence on earnings
and through the tax/transfer system on public finances. This paper looks at the
relationship between education, income, taxation and social benefits in four
European countries. Typically microeconometric studies on the returns to250 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
education have focused on the private returns to education (the relationship
between the productivity of a worker and their education level). Additionally
however, increased education through the increase in labour earnings can lead
to higher taxes and lower transfers. This is as a result of the fact that taxes and
social benefits are generally related to earnings. This paper shall focus on this
issue, looking at the returns to education in four European countries, Germany,
Ireland, Italy and the UK in relation to the tax-transfer system.
Traditionally rates of return have simply looked at the gross rate of return:
rates of return for those who spend an entire working lifetime in employment
and do not factor in periods when the return to education is zero during periods
out of work. This paper attempts to estimate a wider measure of the return to
education; the net return. Also in addition to reporting internal rates of return,
the paper develops a concept similar to the marginal tax rate used in public
finance, the marginal rate of benefit, which estimates the rate of return in terms
of a marginal change in education. In order to carry out this analysis, a micro-
simulation methodology is employed. First, the relationship between earnings
and education is modelled using Mincer style earnings equations. These results
are fed into a microsimulation model, which estimate the changes to tax liabilities
and benefit entitlement due to a marginal change in education levels, enabling
the fiscal, private and the social rates of return to be simulated.
II  BACKGROUND
This paper takes the human capital approach to returns to education which
assumes that education improves a worker’s productivity and thus earnings,
that earnings rise over time, that the rate of increase falls with age and that the
rate of return falls as educational attainment rises.1
Rates of return measures often ignore the fact of differential employment
rates by education level, only considering those with positive earnings. However,
the higher educated are more likely to be employed (see Table 1). In the countries
studied, this effect is strongest in Ireland and Germany for men and stronger
for women in each country, especially Ireland and Italy. More educated workers
are likely to be able to perform a wider range of tasks than less educated workers,
both because of higher specific human capital and because they are easier to
train in new skills. They will thus be able to position themselves higher in the
employment queue. Individuals with higher education levels are also likely to
1. Although there has been some debate that differential earnings from education result from
its use as a screening mechanism, there is little empirical evidence for this (See Kroch and Sjoblom,
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have higher potential wages in work and thus have lower replacement rates,
leading to higher labour supply levels. This effect is likely to be compounded by
family circumstances for women such as the presence of children, hence the
particularly low labour supply rates for less educated married women. Low
educated workers are also likely to be more dispensable during economic
downturns and thus will tend to have lower employment tenures. This trend
has worsened over time as the employment position of the lowest achievers has
worsened with respect to the highest achievers (See Glyn and Salverda, 1998).
Table 1: Ratio of Employment for Those with Tertiary Education to Those With







In response to this trend, recent policies targeted at the unemployed have
tried to increase skill levels in order to improve the chances of getting a job.
Examples include FÁS training schemes in Ireland, the New Deal in the UK,
and the labour market integration aspects of the RMI in France. What evidence
is there that this is successful and therefore that differential employment rates
affect the rate of return? It is possible that as the best of the poorly educated
individuals move to higher levels of education the unemployment levels of both
high and low educated individuals increase as the average quality of workers in
both groups decrease. There is however little evidence for this. In a study on the
impact of rising educational levels on employment in Germany and the USA,
Orszag et al. (1998) found that the relative position of the less educated has
worsened over time. Although the unemployment rate of the higher educated
has broadly followed aggregate trends, the unemployment ratio of the lowest
educated to the highest educated has gradually risen.
III  METHODOLOGY
Measuring the Return to Education
This section develops a number of concepts of rates of return to education.
First the internal rate of return to education is the discount rate, r in formula
(1) such that discounted benefits of extra education, Benefit(s+ d) – Benefit(s)252 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
are equal to discounted costs of education, Cost(d), where s is the amount of
schooling and d is an extra amount of education.
  









However the internal rate of return is very expensive in terms of data,
requiring the life-time earnings streams. A less demanding measure akin to the
marginal tax rate is the marginal benefit rate described in formula (2) which is
the ratio of benefit of a marginal difference in education level to the cost of the
marginal change in education.2 This effectively is a measure of the rate of return
to an investment at a particular point in time rather than across the life-cycle.
Because simulation allows marginal benefits to be calculated for individuals
this measure has an advantage that estimates can be produced for sub-groups
of the population, such as for different age groups or income levels. It thus
allows one to examine the degree of targeting of government policy.
  




The benefits and the costs however depend on whose perspective the rate of
return is being measured. From society’s point of view the rate of return relevant
is the social return to education. In this case we consider only monetary benefits
to society from increased total earnings (gross earnings plus employer
contributions), ignoring other non-monetary benefits such as reduced crime levels
and other spillovers.3 Total costs to society refer to total earnings forgone plus
the direct costs both public and private of education.4 The second concept
examined is the private return to education, which measures the marginal benefit
to the individual (net private income: earnings plus transfers minus taxes and
contributions) to the private cost of extra schooling (direct private educational
costs plus net private income forgone).5 Third, we focus on the fiscal return to
investment in education, where benefits are net government revenue (taxes
plus contributions minus transfers) and costs are net revenue forgone plus the
public direct cost of education.
2. However that costs and benefits do not occur at the same time. For convenience we make an
assumption that discount rates are equal to growth rates, and therefore it is possible to compare
price adjusted quantities from different time periods in this manner.
3. In fact Haveman and Wolfe (1984) find that in the USA, standard rate of return estimates
capture only about three-fifths of the full-value of education.
4. Note we assume that there are no forgone earnings for those aged under 16.
5. Because state transfers are quite limited to younger people, we assume no forgone benefits.MICROSIMULATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 253
Our estimates of the return to education extend the concept in a number of
ways. First, the measure we use is net returns. Most estimates of the rate of
return to education described in the literature are gross rates of return (See
Psacharopoulos, 1993). They only account for the rate of return on the basis of
individuals with positive earnings and do not factor in the fact that those with
higher education levels are also more likely to be in employment. Thus the net
rate of return should be higher than the gross rate of return. In addition, because
taxes and social transfers are simulated in a microsimulation model, it is possible
to measure benefits (and costs) which more closely resemble those experienced
by individuals. For example, the existence of tax systems will reduce the private
rate of return to education based on net earnings rather than on gross earnings.
Progressive tax systems will make this effect more pronounced at higher
education levels. In addition, incorporating employer social contributions in social
returns will have the effect of increasing returns.
In measuring the return to education, we examine the differences in costs
and benefits between two education levels. For the internal rate of return, we
look at the difference between actual education levels, such as upper secondary
and tertiary, however for the marginal benefit of education, we look at a marginal
difference in education of one year.
For both measures we first need the level of earnings at the different levels of
education. In estimating internal rates of return, as we do not have access to
lifetime earnings streams, we generate pseudo earnings streams using cross-
section information by averaging across age and education groups. Age earnings
curves based on cross-section data find that earnings fall for higher age groups,
however actual cohort information would produce constantly rising wage levels
over the lifetime, but with a falling rate of increase. To counteract the cross-
section effect we assume a wage growth of 1 per cent per year (See Alsalam and
Conley, 1997). We simulate the marginal benefit of education using Mincerian
earnings functions, combined with a mechanism to account for increasing
employment levels.
Estimating Fiscal Costs and Benefits using Microsimulation
As the benefits and costs of education relating to education are not necessarily
available in the datasets used to calculate the returns to education, a simulation
method is necessary; in this case the use of microsimulation models (MSM’s).
Microsimulation modelling has existed since the 1950s and has been developed
to analyse complex interactions at the micro level, frequently the simulation of
tax liabilities and benefit entitlements of the household population.6 They take
6. For a recent survey, see Sutherland (1995).254 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
as their information base, nationally representative micro-datasets which contain
data on the labour market, income, expenditure and demographic characteristics
of individuals and households.
Microsimulation Models have a number of advantages. In being a micro-
analytic framework, they allow analysts to study the impact of public policy at
the level of the individual or family. Second, in using a simulation methodology,
they allow one to generate missing information and also to pool data from
different sources. Most importantly however, they allow one to simulate the
impacts of alternative scenarios such as different public policy developments.
This paper uses a microsimulation model developed to carry out cross-country
comparisons of tax-benefit systems in different European countries; in this case,
Germany, Ireland, Italy and the UK.7 The model takes data from national
household micro-datasets8 and simulates a variety of policy instruments
including, income taxes, employer and personal social insurance contributions,
family benefits and social assistance benefits for the year 1994. Combining
government policy with income information contained in the base surveys such
as employment income, pensions, investment income and social benefits, it is
possible to simulate internationally comparable definitions of disposable income.
The model simulates taxes and benefits for the units of assessment for which
the legislation applies. So for example, social insurance contributions are
generally charged to individuals, family benefits paid to families, income taxes
charged to either individuals or couples and social assistance benefits paid to
either families or households. In order to estimate returns to education it is
necessary to apportion receipt of benefits and tax liabilities across the tax/benefit
assessment unit to the individuals which comprise the unit. Apportioning taxes
and benefits in this manner raises a number of technical issues raised in
Sutherland (1996). This paper adopts a number of assumptions used by her, so
that where possible child benefits are treated as accruing to the mother of the
child and social benefits are divided equally between the adults covered by the
assessment unit. Income taxes are sometimes family based in for example
Germany and Ireland, therefore in order to assign taxes to individuals, the
average tax rate of the assessment unit is used.
7. See Bourguignon et al. (1998) for a detailed description of the model.
8. Data used are as follows: The German Socio-Economic Panel have been made available by
Deutches Institut fur Wirschaftforschung, the Irish 1987 Survey on Income Distribution, Poverty
and the Usage of State Services by The Economic and Social Research Institute and the Survey of
Italian Households by the Bank of Italy. Data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey are Crown
Copyright and have been made available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the
Data Archive and are used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive bears any
responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. The same disclaimer
applies for DIW, ESRI and the Bank of Italy for the German, Irish and Italian data.MICROSIMULATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 255
Source: Author’s Calculations.
Note: Equivalence Scale: square root of household size.
Figure 1: Structure of the Tax-Benefit Systems. Taxes (including employer
social contributions) and Benefits as a Percentage of Household Gross Income256 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Structure of the Tax-Benefit Systems
The way in which the tax-transfer system interacts with earnings is an
important determinant of the returns to education. Figure 1 outlines the
distribution of tax (including employer contributions) and benefit rates for each
equivalised household disposable income decile in each country. Germany and
Italy have both higher average and less progressive tax rates than Ireland and
the UK,9 with Italy even having a decline in the rate at the top of the distribution
as a result of lower employer social insurance contributions. The table also
highlights the difference between the social insurance model in Germany and
Italy, which have earnings related benefits spread across the income distribution
and the social assistance model in Ireland and the UK, where benefits are quite
closely targeted at the bottom of the distribution. The higher the level of tax-
benefits and the greater the progressivity of the system, the higher the marginal
effect of education on tax-benefits.
Estimation of Labour Market Returns
Here we describe the estimation of the labour market effect used in the
marginal benefit of education calculation. In addition to measuring the
relationship between education and earnings for employees, we also measure
the relationship for self-employment earnings and those without employment.10
In measuring the impact of education on employee and self-employment earnings,
the analysis makes use of OLS earnings functions, described in formula (3)
below.11 Here, s is the number of years of schooling (defined in O’Donoghue,
1999), e the potential number of years of experience (Age – minus years of
schooling – 6), YG is gross earnings and X other factors such as marital status
and number of children.12
      lnYi
G =a+b 1s1 +b2ei
2 +b.Xi +e i (3)
Table 2 reports the education and experience coefficients on gender specific
wage equations for logged employment and self-employment earnings for each
country. The coefficients of the employment earnings equations have the expected
  9.  Over the whole distribution, the tax rate is lower in Germany and Italy than Ireland and the
UK. However in the top half of the distribution the Germany tax/contribution system is the most
progressive.
10.  Although increased education levels may lead to increased productivity and higher stock
market returns leading to increased pension returns and higher investment income, this paper
ignores this in the evaluation of the rate of return to education due to the complexity of the linkage.
11.  Callan and Harmon (1997) argue that OLS estimates of returns to education may be biased,
reporting that in the literature, OLS tended to bias downwards the returns to education.
12.  It may be desirable to include other variables that impact on earnings such as local labour
market conditions. However these variables are not available in all 4 datasets countries and therefore
we follow the approach of Lorenz and Wagner (1990) and model simple Mincer style equations.MICROSIMULATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 257
format, with positive coefficients on years of education and experience and
negative coefficients on the square of experience. This is also mainly the case
for self-employment earnings, a result that tends to reject the screening
hypothesis. Coefficients on self-employment earnings are not significant for
Germany. This however is likely to have more to do with the structure of the
labour market, with a relatively small number of self-employed persons rather
than the nature of returns to education. As a result of the large vocational
segment in the education system, Germany has very identifiable links between
education and employment and thus clearer returns to education. Finally,
schooling coefficients tend to be inversely related to the wealth of the country
indicating some degree of diminishing returns.13
Table 2: Selected Coefficients on Employee and Self-Employment Earnings
Equations
   Germany     Ireland Italy UK
Variable Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Employee Earnings
Education .078 .071 .081 .099 .09 .092 .10 .13
Experience .094 0.088 .063 .065 .066 .0475 .054 .045
Experience2 –.0017 –0.0016 –.001 –.0014 –.001 –.00049 –.001 –.001
Self-Employment Earnings
Education ** ** .12 -.006 .089 .038 .076 .045
Experience ** ** .046 -.05 .07 .017 .045 .041
Experience2 ** ** –.0008 .0008 –.001 –.0003 –.0008–.001
Source: Author’s Calculations.
Note: Dep. Variables: ln(Employee Earns) and ln(Self Employment Earns).
** means not significant.
In order to estimate net returns to education one needs in addition to estimate
the effect of education on employment. The marginal effect of education is likely
to increase labour supply and demand. This can occur from increased partici-
pation rates or increased number of hours worked per year. Incorporating a
detailed model of labour supply and demand is beyond the scope of the paper.
Instead the paper avoids the latter issue, by focusing on earnings rather than
wage rates and explores the sensitivity of the results to two assumptions about
participation rates. (1) As is typically done, explore rates of return to employees
only, i.e. assume no employment effect and (2) assume that those with higher
13. The exception however is the UK, partially due to the sensitivity of the schooling coefficient to
the choice of experience proxy used; the use of age results in a relatively lower schooling coefficient.258 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
education levels will have the same employment probabilities as those with the
same education level in the dataset.
In order to model the marginal effect of education, we need to measure the
effect of a marginal increase in education. For those already in employment, we
estimate (in formula 4), the effect on earnings, Y, of m extra years of education,
allowing for the fact that m extra years of education implies m less years of
experience, e . In simulating the marginal effect of education, we could have
chosen a positive or a negative marginal amount. As rates of returns diminish
with education, choosing a negative marginal amount would result in higher
rates of return than a positive amount. We chose the more conservative option,
the positive marginal change in education.
   Y1 /Y= exp
(b1xm+b2x(-m)+b3x(-2mxe+m
2)) (4)
For those moving from out-of work to in-work, we model potential in work
earnings using formula (3). Using an OLS earnings function estimated on in-
work earnings may result in sample selection bias when predicting wages of
those currently out-of-work. However the datasets available do not permit the
use of techniques such as Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979) and in any
case studies which have incorporated selection bias have found little impact on
the rate of return (Psacharopoulos, 1993).
Costs of Education
Table 3 describes average educational expenditures per student in each
country by public and private expenditure and by Primary/Secondary and
Tertiary. The difference between the educational expenditures per student is
related to the difference between the wealth of the countries. The OECD figures
do not contain information on private expenditures in the UK. Containing a
substantial private educational sector, social and private rates of return to
education will be overestimated as a result.
Table 3: Public and Private Costs of Education (1994) (in ECU)
Primary & Tertiary Total GDP per
Secondary Capita
Public Private Public Private Average
Germany 3683 1156 7629 773 5311 18326
Ireland 2349 108 6808 1670 4154 14171
Italy 4648 0 4978 566 4899 17086
UK 3773 0 7939 0 4469 16442
Source: OECD (1996) (adjusting for inflation).MICROSIMULATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 259
Perhaps the most important cost of education is the impact of forgone earnings.
In estimating forgone earnings, ideally one should use the difference between
potential earnings if an individual had worked rather than went to school and
the amount of part-time earnings of students. Information on the latter is very
varied across the datasets used in this paper and so only forgone earnings are
accounted for here. The value of forgone earnings used for each individual
depends on the employee earnings functions estimated above and forgone taxes
are estimated using a microsimulation model. Lastly we assume that due to
youth unemployment, not all individuals have forgone earnings and we thus
allow for age/gender specific unemployment rates.
IV  RESULTS
Internal Rates of Return
Table 4 reports estimates of the internal rate of return to education in
Germany, Ireland, Italy and the UK for each level of education relative to the
next lowest level. Incorporating direct costs of education, these estimates will
be relatively higher than those produced using regression methods, while
measuring net rates of return, estimates will be relatively higher. Because
discounting has a greater effect for higher ages, cases where benefit differentials
are higher for younger age groups will have higher rates of return than for
instances where the relative differential is higher for older people. We must
however be cautious in the interpretation of the results as they are quite sensitive
to classification decisions made about national educational qualifications.
Although datasets exist with better education information, they do not
necessarily contain the information necessary to simulate taxes and benefits in
a detailed fashion. Nevertheless, overall returns tend to diminish with education
level, which corresponds with previous gross estimates.
There are however a number of exceptions. Rates of return for upper secondary
education are lower relative to tertiary education in Germany. This is primarily
a result of the concentration of those with vocational qualifications in the level
below, lower secondary. Those with vocational qualifications tend to have an
earnings premium relative to those with equivalent educational qualifications
and thus the position of the lower secondary educated individuals, will be closer
to the upper secondary educated than in other countries. Only at older ages is
the difference in returns substantial, but the discount rate reduces the effect of
difference amongst older ages rather than younger ages.
Returns tend to be higher for women than for men, which are as a result of
higher employment and earnings differentials for women than for men. An
exception is in the case of non tertiary educated women in Ireland and the UK.
In Ireland, the participation rates of secondary or lower educated women are260 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
quite low, especially for higher age groups and thus even if earnings differentials
are higher, the net return is lower. In the UK on the other-hand, earnings
differentials for non-tertiary educated women are quite low relative to university
educated women. Also in Italy the position in the lifecycle of the earnings
differential and thus the discount rate has a strong effect, where higher earnings
differentials for university educated women occur later in life.
Table 4: Internal Rates of Return to Education
Germany Ireland Italy UK
LS US T LS US T LS US T LS US T
Male
Social 13.0 5.0 8.0 14.5 15.7 5.7 12.5 7.1 6.3 HI 15.3 7.7
Private 13.7 5.0 9.9 14.1 17.0 5.8 HI 6.7 6.2 HI 18.3 7.6
Fiscal 12.5 5.1 6.5 15.0 14.5 5.5 8.0 7.5 6.4 HI 13.3 7.9
Female
Social 15.7 5.5 9.3 6.2 13.9 7.8 12.3 10.0 4.0 HI 13.6 9.2
Private 17.5 5.6 12.0 4.6 15.0 8.5 HI 11.1 5.3 HI 15.4 8.8
Fiscal 14.5 5.5 7.4 7.0 13.1 7.1 8.2 8.9 2.5 HI 12.6 9.5
Source: Author’s Calculations.
Notes: 1. Lower Secondary (LS.), Upper Secondary (US) and Tertiary Education (T).
 2. HI: returns are high, primarily due to low forgone earnings and no private expenditures.
Marginal Benefit Rate
Table 5 outlines the marginal benefit of education in terms of social, private
and fiscal benefits. The values in the table represent the average marginal benefit
rate of a marginal increase in education. Two scenarios are considered, at one
extreme where the marginal benefit of education does not include any
employment response and at the other, where existing employment differentials
are maintained.
Because social and private returns are primarily driven by the relationship
between education and earnings, estimated in Table 2, the higher the impact of
education on earnings, the higher the marginal benefits. This is largely the
case, with Germany having the lowest and UK having the highest marginal
benefits. The distribution of costs is also a factor. Hence marginal benefits are
relatively lower in Germany as a result of lower youth unemployment, which
means that young people opting not to continue in education are more likely to
find a job than in other countries. In addition missing data on private costs of
education in the UK make social and private marginal benefits higher than one
might expect. This relationship is not however maintained for fiscal benefits.MICROSIMULATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 261
Here the size of the tax system dominates, so that Italy and Germany with the
highest tax rates have the highest ratio of fiscal to social returns. We also notice
that although the UK has the highest private and social returns, it has the
third highest fiscal returns as a result of the lower tax rate. Comparing the
three measures, we find that private returns are higher than social returns
which are in turn higher than fiscal returns.
If we also consider the employment differential in estimating marginal
benefits, we would expect the countries with higher unemployment benefit rates
and/or high unemployment levels to have higher fiscal returns. Also the higher
the replacement rate, the lower the private returns and the lower the social
returns. We notice that in general when considering employment differentials
in the measurement of the marginal benefit, fiscal returns increase the most.
Thus in using education as a mechanism to promote employment, the state
gains relatively more than do those moving into employment. The biggest impact
on fiscal returns occurs in Germany, which in addition to having a high employ-
ment differential for men has quite high unemployment benefits. Fiscal returns
increase the least in Italy as a result of a low level of unemployment benefits,
which correspondingly result in the highest increase in private returns.
Table 5: Social, Private and Fiscal Marginal Benefits of Education
Social Private Fiscal Social Private Fiscal
Earnings Earnings + Unemployment
Germany 5.0 7.0 3.9 6.7 9.6 5.0
Ireland 8.8 14.4 5.3 10.1 15.7 6.5
Italy 8.2 17.0 5.7 10.3 23.4 6.6
UK 10.3 23.1 4.7 11.7 25.7 5.6
Source: Author’s calculations.
The marginal benefit however may vary by age group. For example older
workers lived through a different time period to that which the current young
will live and have different life experiences, educational levels and preferences.
Different age groups may also have different participation rates. Table 6 looks
at the average marginal benefit rate by age group. There are a number of factors
that affect the marginal benefit of education by age group. First, age earnings
profiles tend to rise initially and then fall with age in a cross-section of the
population, thus the absolute earnings differential will rise and fall with age.
The progressivity of tax-benefit systems will magnify the result. Finally, older
people will tend to have lower education levels and thus lower costs of education
in terms of direct expenditure and forgone earnings. Employment differentials262 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
also widen as individuals get older, hence another reason for higher returns.
Thus marginal benefits are consistently highest for the 50-65 age group. The
next highest group in general are the 30-50 year olds. Marginal benefit rates as
measured here are however lowest for the over 65s because in general, labour
market earnings cease and thus rates of return tend to diminish to zero. This
effect however may differ if pensions were modelled, although inequality levels
are in general lower amongst the elderly and so the marginal benefit of education
is likely to be much lower than for those of working age.
Table 6: Social, Private and Fiscal Marginal Benefits of Education by Age Group
Germany Ireland Italy UK
Age Soc. Priv. Fisc. Soc. Priv. Fisc. Soc. Priv. Fisc. Soc. Priv. Fisc.
<30 6.9 11.1 4.7 3.7 4.7 3.0 7.1 17.8 3.4 10.3 20.0 5.3
<50 6.0 8.1 4.7 13.5 20.9 9.1 12.8 23.5 9.1 14.7 30.6 6.9
<65 13.8 19.4 10.6 21.6 38.4 12.5 16.0 48.2 10.1 15.9 39.7 8.2
>=65 0.2 0.3 0.2 5.4 14.0 1.6 0.9 2.5 0.7 0.6 2.5 0.2
Source: Author’s Calculations.
Note: Employment differentials are applied.
We now turn to a different distribution of marginal benefits of education,
focusing instead on the distribution by equivalised household disposable income
(See Table 7). What factors will influence the distribution of marginal benefits
by income? First, as income rises by decile, although the proportional effect of
education on income diminishes, the absolute amount increases and thus the
change in income relative to a common cost is higher. This will tend to result in
higher rates of return higher up the income distribution. Second, pensioners
will tend to be in the bottom half of the income distribution and thus we would
expect marginal benefits to be lower. Conversely, because of the lower
employment rates at the bottom, the employment effect of a marginal change in
education is likely to be higher at the bottom. The results confirm that marginal
benefits, especially private benefits rise with income. Private benefits in Italy
move in the opposite direction, largely as a result of very low replacement rates
for unemployed people. Also although in general fiscal returns tend to be less
variable than the other measures, this is not the case in Italy with few benefits
at the bottom of the income distribution combined with a relatively high tax
system. Marginal fiscal benefits for the UK in fact go negative at the bottom of
the distribution as a result of fiscal policies which increase benefits for those
who enter work.MICROSIMULATION AND RETURNS TO EDUCATION 263
Table 7: Distribution of the Marginal Benefit of Education by Income
(Average rate of return per equivalent disposable income quintile)
Germany Ireland Italy UK
Deciles Soc. Priv. Fisc. Soc. Priv. Fisc. Soc. Priv. Fisc. Soc. Priv. Fisc.
  1 2.3 3.3 1.7 5.3 8.0 4.3 5.4 31.0 2.3 3.4 29.3 -5.1
  2 4.8 7.5 3.3 6.1 9.6 4.8 6.7 24.8 3.4 4.7 26.5 -1.1
  3 3.4 4.4 2.8 4.3 9.5 2.1 7.2 25.5 4.1 5.3 20.3 1.2
  4 4.0 5.8 3.0 7.6 14.9 4.5 10.0 33.8 5.3 6.8 17.5 2.9
  5 3.3 5.2 2.2 9.7 18.1 5.2 8.9 23.4 5.6 8.2 19.5 4.1
  6 6.5 9.1 5.0 9.2 16.5 4.9 9.6 24.0 6.0 10.7 23.2 5.6
  7 7.1 9.7 5.6 9.7 17.1 5.2 12.4 29.6 7.6 11.9 23.2 6.7
  8 8.7 11.8 6.8 9.9 13.9 7.2 12.3 25.1 8.2 14.4 28.6 8.1
  9 9.5 13.7 7.1 10.9 14.6 8.2 11.8 19.8 8.6 15.4 28.4 9.0
10 11.1 16.4 8.2 13.5 18.4 9.6 12.2 17.8 9.6 18.8 30.4 11.7
Source: Author’s Calculations. Note Employment differentials are applied.
V  CONCLUSIONS
This paper attempts to use microsimulation methods to compare returns to
education in four European countries, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United
Kingdom. Previous papers on this subject have tended to focus solely on the
gross return to education, both in terms of focusing only on those with in-work
incomes and ignoring the impact of tax-benefits. This paper broadens the type
of measure used to include interactions with public tax-transfer systems and to
consider the effect of differential employment rates on education. The paper
considers returns from the perspective of society, the individual and the public
finances.
Two measures of the return to education were used, the internal rate of return
and the marginal benefit. The estimates of the internal rate of return produce
results consistent with other international comparisons, that rates of return
tend to diminish with education level and that rates of return for women usually
exceed those of men. The results however, are quite sensitive to the classification
of education level and to the degree of the employment differential by education.
Turning to the marginal benefit of education, we find that private returns
are higher than social and fiscal returns to education. This would suggest that
individuals gain more from education than society in general and more than
the public finances do. Also, it seems that those with higher incomes have higher
private marginal benefits than those with lower incomes. Caution must be taken
when observing this result as this model estimates only monetary returns. Non-
monetary returns such as crime reduction, technological innovation and264 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
intergenerational benefits are not considered which may redress the balance
between social and private benefits to education.
When employment differentials are considered, we find that fiscal returns
increase relatively more than do social or private marginal benefits. Thus
although our extreme assumption may overstate the effect of education on
employment, it emphasises the cost to the exchequer of unemployment and the
corresponding returns in terms of lower social spending and higher taxes of
increased employment levels.
The results of this paper would therefore give support for policies advocated
by the OECD and others and implemented in the UK, whereby because of higher
private returns to education, some degree of state/individual co-financing is
recommended. Because private marginal benefit tend to be higher for those
with higher incomes and because tertiary education has relatively lower rates
of return, it may be more effective to have co-financing for tertiary education
rather than other levels.
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